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Abstract 
Passive investment strategies can be improved by statistically sorting the market based on various 
metrics known as factors. By only buying top securities of the market based on the sorting factor, 
the portfolio can generate higher returns while still maintaining high diversification. I found that 
two factors, value (sort based on book value to market value -ratio) and momentum (sort based 
on past performance), generated stable and statistically significant excess-returns based on data 
from 1926 to 2018.  
The aim of this study was to evaluate the factors’ past performance and to provide logical reasons 
for their persistence in the future. Key challenge to using factor sorting in investing is the risk of 
market pricing the excess-returns out. However, I provide evidence that release of new 
information has not led to significantly smaller factor returns. Also, I note that slow rebalancing of 
portfolio betas can explain part of the poor performance of momentum strategies during 
economic downturns. Furthermore, I analyzed volatilities of portfolios combining both factors with 
the market portfolio and found that diversifying investment portfolio over multiple sources of risk 
increases risk-adjusted returns.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Structure  
In this thesis I will study factor investing strategies and their reliability in the future. The goal of 
this thesis is to explain why factor investing can be profitable and validate these reasons with data 
analysis. First, I will explain the basic fundamental ideas behind factor investing. I will go through 
different approaches to investing and explain how factor investing differs from traditional 
investment strategies. In addition, I will present various general methods to evaluate investments. 
Second, I will review literature that supports factor investing and explaining how factors are 
detected and validated. Third, I will go through the methodology of my analysis and how I set up 
my test portfolios along with explanations for my approach. Fourth, I will present my test factors 
and results. Finally, I will combine the two factors to explain diversification across factor and 
equity risks and present conclusions as well as topics for further research.  
1.2 Research questions and the scope of this thesis 
My research question is divided into a series of hypotheses. Are there mispricings in the market 
than can be measured by sorting the market based on various factors and explained by logical 
reasons? If yes, is there a way to implement an investment strategy to take advantage of those 
mispricings? If yes, has that strategy proven to be so efficient and reliable in the past, that it could 
be used also in the future? If yes, how should such strategy be implemented in practice?  
The scope of this thesis is limited to the equity market (stock market) of the United States. I do 
briefly refer to literature which discusses similar mispricings and strategies in other asset classes 
and geographical markets as well, but my analysis is based purely on return data of US equity 
market. I do not cover every factor strategy that I found reliable, but instead limit my analysis of 
two factors that I found the most reliable.  
1.3 Introduction to differences between active and passive investment strategies 
I will begin with briefly explaining my perception of concepts related to factor investing based on 
literature that I have studied. Factor investing is a specific approach to long-term investing, which 
is closely related to investing in an index consisting of very large number of stocks or other 
securities. Investment strategies, which involve investing in an index are also known as passive 
investment strategies. Their fundamental idea is to maximize the investment portfolio’s 
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diversification in order to provide stable returns over very long periods of time, which in this case 
can be as long as 10 or 20 years. When investor invests in an index, he effectively buys a small 
share of all the securities within an index, which often means hundreds or even thousands of 
different securities. This is made possible by different kinds of investment funds. The investors 
invest in the fund and the fund then purchases the securities in the index. This way, the investor 
can invest in a very large number of securities without having to pay large transaction fees for 
purchasing each of the securities independently.  
Active investing 
The opposite of these passive strategies is active investment management. In the passive strategy 
the investor buys the securities and then holds them even if the securities lose part of their value 
during the investment period. The speed of economic growth varies cyclically, which means that 
sometimes the growth speed is faster and other times it is slower. The changes between economic 
cycle’s phases typically translate to the prices of investment securities as well. A classic example is 
the stock market, where the stock prices typically increase and decrease over time.  
The periods when the stock markets are rising are called bull markets and the periods when the 
stock market is losing value are called bear markets. Some investors try to profit from these 
changes by trying to identify securities that are increasing value and only investing in those. This is 
called active investment management. Its downsides include lower diversification, higher 
transaction costs and the inevitable difficulty of identifying the right moments for buying and 
selling.  
Investors and academics have argued for years which of the two approaches is superior, active or 
passive. As David M. Blanchett and Craig L. Israelsen note in their article “Spotlighting Common 
Methodological Biases in Active-Vs.-Passive Studies” (2007), the answer is not that simple. Both 
types of strategies have found support over the years, even though the passive strategies are 
more often found to be better.  
In this thesis, I will not be studying whether active or passive investment management is the 
superior choice. However, I argue that it is important to understand the difference between active 
and passive investing to fully understand the benefits of factor investing. I will handle a topic that 
deals with a problem regarding the passive strategies. The reason why many investors choose the 
route of stock picking is simply the relatively low expected return of the passive investment 
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strategies. For example, The Helsinki Stock Market has historically returned 12,91 % annually with 
sample period from 1912 to 2009 according to a study by Peter Nyberg and Mika Vaihekoski 
“Equity premium in Finland and long-term performance of the Finnish equity and money markets” 
(2013). This is a nominal rate that includes dividend gains but does not take inflation into account. 
However, this is irrelevant when simply comparing active and passive strategies. 
Although this might seem like a relatively decent rate of return, the sample period always contains 
lengthy periods of much lower returns as well. If the investors choose to go for active stock 
picking, they will face higher transaction costs and less diversification. If investor invests in an 
actively managed mutual/investment fund, they will face high management costs as well.  
Why diversification is important? 
Diversification is known as the “only free lunch in investing” as it effectively decreases the 
portfolio risk without lowering the expected rate of return, as mentioned by Antti Ilmanen (2011). 
According to the theory of efficient markets, which was first published by Eugene Fama (1965) in 
his article “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices”, all the securities should have identical risk to 
return -ratio, because the market pricing of each security reflects all the information available that 
is related to the security. This means that if the security poses a higher risk, it also has a higher 
expected rate of return. If any security would produce higher, or so-called excess returns, the 
informed investors would take advantage of this arbitrage situation and the profits would be 
immediately priced out. Thus, there should be no securities in the market that would provide the 
investor with excess returns compared to other securities.  
The developments of prices of different securities do vary, however. This causes negative 
correlation between the price developments which lowers the portfolio risk without decreasing 
the expected rate of return, which is known as diversification benefit. If the investor invests in only 
one security and its market value decreases 10 %, the investor loses 10 % of his total investment. If 
the investor invests in 10 securities and one of them loses 10 %, the investor only loses 1 % of his 
total investment. However, because all the securities have identical risk to return -ratio, both 
portfolios have identical expected rate of return, even though the latter has a significantly lower 
risk. The risk of a single security is often measured by its volatility or the square root of its 
variance: 
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𝜎(𝑟) =  √𝜎2(𝑟) =  √∑ 𝑝𝑖[𝑟𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑟)]2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
E(r) represents the average expected return of the security, rs represents the expected return in 
scenario s and ps represents the probability of scenario s. To account for negative and positive 
values offsetting each other out, the values are raised to the power of two to achieve a figure 
known as variance. Because variance has been raised to the power of two, it cannot be used as 
such but instead the square root of variance, the volatility (also known as standard deviation), is 
used.  
When we add new securities to portfolio, the combined volatility of the portfolio starts 
decreasing. As mentioned above, this is the fundamental idea underlying behind passive 
investment strategies. Because the expected return to risk ratio is identical for all securities, the 
rational investor should just simply buy all the securities to maximize his diversification and thus 
minimize his portfolio volatility to achieve the best possible portfolio risk to return -ratio. There 
might be times when active stock picking will produce higher returns, but in the long run, the 
passive investor will always make the highest profits.  
1.4 Factor investing as a method to increase passive investment returns 
Simply buying all the securities in a market does not intuitively seem like the best possible 
strategy, however. Eugene Fama, together with Kenneth French (1992), are responsible for 
popularizing an investment approach called factor investing as an extension to the well-known 
Capital Asset Pricing -model, or CAPM, which was originally created by William Sharpe in 1964. 
Before diving into the fundamental ideas of factor investing, I briefly present the CAPM.  
The CAPM presents the expected return of a single security by comparing its riskiness to the risk-
free rate and the expected return of the market portfolio. The risk-free rate varies, but usually 
government bond yields with the highest credit scores are considered risk free. Examples of these 
bonds would be the German government bonds in Europe or the US Treasuries in the United 
States. The riskiness of a single security is measured with beta, which effectively compares the 
covariance between the stock and the market to the variance of the entire market. Covariance is 
calculated similarly to the variance: 
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𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) =  
1
𝑛
∑[𝑥𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑥)] ∗ [𝑦𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑦)]
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
In this case, the single security return is expressed with x and the market return is expressed with 
y. The beta (β) is then calculated as follows: 
𝛽𝑖 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚)
 
where m refers to market and i refers to the single security. When the beta, the risk-free return (rf) 
and the expected market return [E(rm)] are known, the CAPM takes the shape of: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) =  𝑟𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) −  𝑟𝑓] 
From this equation we can clearly see, that the expected return of the stock increases when the 
beta or its riskiness increases. The beta is often seen as a measure of individual security’s riskiness 
as it represents the security’s covariance with the market. Beta less than one implies a security 
that is less volatile than the market, and vice versa.  
The CAPM tells us that assuming efficient markets, the individual security’s expected return is 
purely explained by its covariance with the market. It’s worth noting, that the CAPM does not take 
into account any metrics traditionally used by market analysts, such as valuation models like price-
to-earnings -ratio or dividend yields. The theory assumes, that this information is distributed to all 
investors and all the new information is priced into the security’s market price immediately 
meaning that investors cannot find under- or overvalued securities just by analyzing for example 
firms’ income levels or valuation metrics.  
Factor investing, however, aims to identify metrics that would provide either risk-based or 
behavioral reasons for certain securities to be mispriced in the long run. These mispricings could 
then be used to create investment strategies generating excess-returns. In the foreword of the 
book “Your Complete Guide To Factor-Based Investing” (2016) by Andrew L. Berkin and Larry E. 
Swedroe, Cliff Asness defines factor investing as “defining and then systematically following a set 
of rules that produce diversified portfolios”. The key is to find those metrics or factors, and then 
instead of buying all the securities in the market, buy the best securities sorted by the chosen 
factor while still maintaining high diversification. By doing this, we maintain the high return-to-risk 
-ratio, low transaction costs and low management costs (due to no one actively managing the 
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portfolio) discussed above but attempt to find logical reasons why some of the securities should 
outperform or underperform the market in the long run.  
2. Review of literature explaining the key characteristics of factors 
In this section, I will review literature and present findings that are common to factors in general. I 
present a list of criteria which can be used to evaluate factors and then discuss differences 
between behavioral and risk-based reasons for mispricing of securities.  
2.1 Criteria for true factors 
As noted by Berkin and Swedroe (2016), one of the key challenges regarding factor investing is 
determining which factors are truly a source for returns, that exceed the returns of market 
portfolio. Market portfolio is considered to be a benchmark for comparison. From this point on, I 
will simply call these higher-than-market returns excess-returns. To clarify, a portfolio can be 
profitable, even if it produces lower returns than the market portfolio. The objective, however, is 
to create a portfolio that produces higher returns than the market portfolio in the long run. The 
challenge is, that we obviously cannot predict what is going to happen in the future, and simply 
data about past returns is no guarantee of future profits.  
If we would take a look at the past returns exclusively, we could probably figure out hundreds of 
different portfolios that would have beaten the market portfolio during past decades. But the 
question remains, that was it simply coincidence or was there a logical reason why the portfolio 
did outperform the market. Many academics have attempted to find out various factors, which 
could be used to generate these market-outperforming portfolios, and that have been able to do 
that in the past. For example, in their paper Campbell R. Harvey, Yan Liu and Heqing Zhu (2015) 
attempted to find out and evaluate various factors suggested by academia, which had been 
evaluated in reputable top-level journals and conferences. Even with their strict criteria, they 
ended up with a total of 316 different factors, which in my opinion is an enormous number even if 
some of the factors presented were highly correlated with each other.  
Campbell et al. (2015) also note, that the “overwhelming majority” of the all the factors they 
studied produced returns that were statistically significant at 5 % significance. However, not all of 
them count as true factors, because their existence is only or mostly based on the past returns, 
they have generated. Even if the past returns have overperformed the benchmark, there might 
have just simply been a special period of time when the metric has worked, but that is of no use 
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for investor if it cannot generate excess-returns reliably also in the future. Berkin and Swedroe 
(2016) present 5 requirements for the metric to be classified as a true factor: 
1) It has to be persistent: The factor must have been able to generate stable excess-returns in 
the past for a long time. 
2) It has to be pervasive: True factors should apply across asset classes, and not only in stocks 
for example. This criterion decreases the risk of the factor being simply a result of data-
mining, because one must study many different markets to classify a metric as a factor.  
3) It has to be robust: There must be multiple metrics that can be used to measure the 
fundamental phenomenon behind the factor. As mentioned, each factor should have a 
logical explanation for its excess-returns, and one must be able to test that logical 
explanation with various metrics.  
4) It has to be investable: Many investing strategies might work in theory, but in the real 
world they might be difficult to execute. For example, a strategy where the investor 
attempts to buy and sell securities with very short intervals to profit from the securities’ 
intraday price movements may generate some profits, but it also generates massive 
transaction fees, which might make the strategy not usable. 
5) It has to be intuitive: As mentioned above, there needs to be a logical, risk or behavioral-
based explanation why the factor should exist. I argue that this is the key to understanding 
why these factors should exist also after they have been discovered and published, and the 
investors are starting to make investment decisions based on them.  
These types of requirements are presented in other academic literature as well. For instance, 
Koedijk, Slager and Stork (2016) also list five requirements for factors, although they emphasize 
the ease of explaining the factor over its robustness.  
2.2 Differences between risk-based and behavioral explanations for mispricings 
I will briefly go through what these terms mean based on explanations provided for example by 
Berkin and Swedroe (2016), and I will present more concrete examples later when studying the 
factors in more detail. When studying the risk-based reasons for higher profits, we must first 
understand the difference between systematic and unsystematic (also known as idiosyncratic) 
risk. Financial theory states that if the investor carries a higher risk on his investments, he should 
be awarded with higher returns, or so-called risk premium, as well. However, this only applies to 
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systematic risk. Systematic risk is the part of the investment’s risk which cannot be diversified 
away. So, as explained above, if the investor decides to invest in only a single security instead of 
investing in the market portfolio, he carries a higher risk. Yet, he could diversify that risk away at 
any time and thus should not be awarded a higher risk premium.  
After the investor has diversified as much as he can, there is little he can do to increase the 
amount of systematic risk to gain higher risk premium. Some of the factors attempt to generate 
higher systematic risk, so the investor could also enjoy the higher premiums. Obviously, higher 
systematic risk could also lead to losing money in short perspective but in the long run, carrying 
higher risk should be awarded with higher returns.  
Behavioral-based reasons are caused by inefficiencies in the way human beings make investment 
decisions. Most traditional financial theories assume efficient markets, which includes the 
assumption that all investors do only rational choices every time they invest. In reality, many 
investors, for example, like to invest in more “high risk, high return” -type of securities which 
might cause them to be overvalued, yet it does not stop investors from investing to them. I argue 
that this can be seen as a one type of gambling, which people do even though it is not rational. 
Some factors try to abuse these behavioral anomalies to generate excess-returns.  
2.2.1 Understanding systematic risk as a source of higher profits 
But why does the market not price out the higher systematic risk if we know it is there? Systematic 
risk of a single security is measured by its covariance with the market (beta) and not by the 
security’s volatility. The underlying logic is a simple adaption of basic economic theory, but 
important for understanding why systematic risk results in risk premiums. Economic theory states, 
that with perfect competition, the marginal cost of any product should match the marginal utility 
that the consumer experiences when consuming the product. In the world of investing, this means 
that under efficient markets, price of any security should match the experienced utility of the 
return investor makes from his/her investment.  
This is important, because as we know, we cannot forecast any excessively high returns under 
efficient markets, but the experienced utility of the same profits might vary. For example, let’s 
assume two stocks, A and B, which both have the same expected rate of return. Stock A is highly 
correlated with the market (high beta), and generates market beating profits during bull markets 
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and vice versa. The stock B is negatively correlated (low or negative beta) with the market and 
outperforms the market during bear markets.  
If the entire market is winning, the investor does not feel too special about the profits he/she 
makes with stock A. However, when the markets are crashing, the joy the investor feels from 
his/her positive return from stock B is a lot higher. Thus, the stock B’s return has higher marginal 
utility which leads to higher price. Now the expected return of any investment is calculated by 
dividing the expected return by the investment’s price. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
Thus, as the expected returns are equal for all stocks, the higher price of low-correlation stocks 
causes them to have lower expected profits, simply because investors value their profits more. In 
the end, all sources of systematic risk, including the factor risks, lead to higher profits because the 
irrational investors do not experience as high utility from systematically risky investments. The 
rational investor can take advantage of this, as in the long run, all the profits are just as valuable. 
Only problem is, that increasing systematic risk is difficult, but that is exactly what the factors aim 
to do.  
I emphasize, that this applies also to factors backed by behavioral explanations, as irrational 
investor behavior is explained by the differences in utilities that the investor experiences. For 
example, the behavioral bias of going for “high risk, high return” is explained by the fact, that 
investors feel higher utility of the chance of big profits, and lower utility of lower yet steadier 
profits.  
2.2.2 Why is it important to recognize the reason for factor’s existence? 
I feel that being able to explain the logic behind any factor is possibly the most important thing to 
do before it can be considered a true factor. When a factor is discovered and discussed in scientific 
journals, it becomes increasingly well known also among investors. After some time, it would be 
logical to think that these increased premiums should be priced out because an increasing number 
of rational investors try to profit from them. The increasing demand increases the price of 
undervalued securities and decreases the demand for overvalued securities.  
It is true, that increase in the use of factor-based strategies naturally decreases their profits, but if 
there is a fundamental reason for their existence, the anomalies do not simply disappear because 
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some investors try to profit from them. For example, the overvaluation of systematically risky 
securities discussed above would not simply stop even if some investors started to implement 
strategies trying to profit from that overvaluation. Berkin and Swedroe aim to identify more of 
these reasons behind the excess-returns. Arnott, Beck, Kalesnik and West (2016) raise a similar 
concern and mention that many research articles promoting new factors fail to provide enough 
credible reasons why the factor should generate structural, long-lasting excess-returns also in the 
future and rely mostly on just the past performance of the factor.  
3. Methodology: Constructing factor portfolios 
In this section, I will go through different methods of measuring factor performance based on 
literature. I will also present the metrics that I used in my data analysis and the style that I used to 
create the test portfolios.  
When discussing the factors in more detail, I will refer to multiple sources, which may have 
constructed their test-portfolios differently. Typically, when investors implement these factor-
based strategies, it is done by a technique called “factor-tilting”. This means, that the investor 
begins constructing their portfolio with 100 % of the funds invested into a vast market-index. For 
example, in many cases this market-index is the Standard & Poor’s 500 -index (S&P500) which is 
commonly considered to be the benchmark index for US equity market. The investor then chooses 
his preferred factors, and then increases the portfolio weights of the securities which should 
provide the largest factor-premiums. In a way, the portfolio is “tilted” towards the chosen factor. 
This type of investing is also known as “smart-beta” investing, discussed for instance by Arnott et 
al. (2016) 
3.1 Short positions in factor portfolios 
One key difference between test-portfolios of different research papers is the use of either 
long/short or long-only portfolios. I will briefly explain the investment strategy of short-selling to 
explain this. If an investor wants to profit from securities being overvalued, he could consider 
lending the security, then selling it instantly. After the overvalued security’s market price has 
decreased, the investor buys back the security and returns it to the lender. The decrease in the 
security’s market price is the investor’s profit, net of any transaction fees and interest paid for 
lending the security. This is known as short-selling and it is important in factor investing as many of 
the factors are actually based on overvaluation of certain securities, rather than undervaluation. 
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So, for instance, if an investor is able to identify a factor which determines part of the stock 
market overvalued, he might simply just avoid buying those stocks or he could systematically also 
short-sell those stocks to increase his profits.  
I note that in my analysis short-selling does not actually increase absolute returns of the portfolios, 
as the short positions generate some profits even if they do underperform compared to market. 
However, the short-selling helps to isolate market risk from the portfolio and generate higher 
factor risk, which can be useful when diversifying across different types of risk premia. This is 
explained and discussed in more detail in section 5.  
Differences between long-only and long/short-portfolios 
A portfolio which uses a combination of buying stocks (taking the long position) and short-selling 
stocks (taking the short position) is known as long/short portfolio. This type of portfolio is used by 
Berkin and Swedroe (2016) for example. If the portfolio does not consist of any short positions, it 
is known as a long-only portfolio, which is a preferred for example by Koedijk et al. (2016). The 
choice between taking short positions or not varies rather a lot and researchers have varying 
opinions over which approach should be taken.  
Long/short-portfolios have the apparent benefit of being zero-cost. The cash flow generated by 
selling the lent stocks short can be used to finance the long positions of the portfolio. Thus, 
implementing long/short-portfolios does not require any capital, although it does increase the 
investor’s financial leverage due to lending of stocks.  
Which portfolio-style should be used? 
Roger Clarke, Harindra de Silva and Steven Thorley (2016) discuss long-only portfolios’ capability of 
capturing these factor premiums in their article and discover that long-only portfolios do better 
when purchasing only several individual stocks. However, when going for a highly diversified 
factor-portfolio, they capture only 40 % of the premium. Similarly, my results discussed in section 
4 of this thesis imply that long/short -portfolios do capture larger premium than long-only -
portfolios. Nevertheless, finding out whether the higher costs of short positions offset this larger 
premium and figuring the general superiority of these approaches is out of scope of this thesis and 
topics for further research.  
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However, I will present my findings based on varying literature on why short-selling is sometimes 
avoided as these are also the reason behind some factor anomalies. First, when purchasing stocks 
or other similar securities, the investor may only lose his invested capital. When short-selling, the 
investor may theoretically lose an infinite amount of capital, as the price of the security does not 
have an upper limit. Thus, the chance of heavy losses increases compared to long positions. 
Second, short positions usually have fixed loan periods for lending the security. This means that 
eventually the lent asset must be returned to the owner. Long positions, on the contrary, can be 
held indefinitely assuming that the asset has any market value left.  
Berkin and Swedroe (2016) note that even 10 years might not be a long enough time to prove the 
efficiency of factor portfolios. Thus, taking short positions is riskier, because the investor cannot 
know how long he will end up holding the position. Finally, the investor must usually also pay 
some interest for lending the security which decreases the profits for short positions. Berkin and 
Swedroe (2016) note that these reasons have led to many investment funds not taking any short 
positions at all as they are considered too speculative.  
3.2 Measuring factor performance 
In general, both factors, that I will discuss, do provide a long history of stable and statistically 
significant excess-returns compared to a benchmark. The statistical significance in most 
publications is measured with Student’s T-test and the excess-returns are measured with simply 
deducting the benchmark returns from the factor-portfolio returns. This way some researchers 
such as Berkin and Swedroe (2016) also calculate the historical odds of outperforming the 
benchmark. One common metric for measuring risk-adjusted excess-returns of a portfolio is also 
the Sharpe Ratio, which is measured by deducting the risk-free return from the historical returns 
of the portfolio and then dividing the result with the portfolio’s volatility. The risk free -rate used 
in all of this thesis’ calculation is the 1-month US T-bill’s interest rate as it is the shortest maturity 
US government bond available and thus also the least risky. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐸(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓)
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓)
 
Sharpe Ratio compares the portfolio’s returns to its riskiness, higher ratio implies better portfolio 
performance.  
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4. Theory behind individual factors and analysis results 
In this section, I will present two different factors that I found the most credible for producing 
stable excess-returns. This section is thus divided in two sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2. In both sub-
sections, I first discuss literature that is relevant uniquely for the factor and its history. Second, I 
will present my analysis of the factor’s absolute historical performance and its statistical 
significance. Last, I will review literature explaining logical reasons why the factor should persist to 
exist also in the future and present my own arguments. 
4.1 Value 
Value investing has been popularized over the years by investors such as Warren Buffett. The 
general idea deals with finding undervalued stocks that will generate high profits in the long run. 
In the world of factor investing, however, the investor does not attempt to pick out stocks that he 
considers undervalued. Instead, the investor must determine a rule which can be used to sort out 
all the stocks so that he can then buy for example the best 30 % of all the stocks.  
The value factor was popularized by Kenneth French and Eugene Fama (1992), although they cite 
Dennis Stattman (1980) as well as Barr Rosenberg, Kenneth Reid and Ronald Lanstein (1985) for 
discovering the phenomenon in the US stock market. French and Fama (1992) took the firms’ book 
values and compared them to the firms’ market values and found that the firm’s that have the 
highest book-to-market value -ratios (BtM) outperform the market in the long run.  
So, in this case, a long-only portfolio based on the BtM-ratio would include for example the top 30 
% of all stocks based on their BtM-ratios. A long/short-portfolio would also short-sell the worst 30 
% based on the BtM-ration. As a side note, the number of securities bought or sold is somewhat 
irrelevant as long as the portfolio is diversified enough. It could be higher or smaller than 30 % but 
the 30 % is the number used, for example, by Berkin and Swedroe. To account for value factor’s 
robustness, I mention that there are other metrics than BtM as well that can be used to capture 
the same phenomenon. Clifford Asness, Antti Ilmanen, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz (2015) 
list a number of metrics including earnings-to-price, cash flow-to-price and sales-to-price ratios.  
The top 30 % of stocks are called value stocks and the worst are known as growth or “glamour” 
stocks. This is because low BtM-ratio is often caused by high market value as the market is pricing 
in a chance for a smaller company to suddenly generate new innovations that would raise its value 
significantly. I note that growth companies are often technology-oriented and even though they 
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rarely end up being highly profitable, there are examples such as Apple or Uber where the owners 
have generated massive profits.  
On the contrary, value companies are often older firms that have already stabilized their positions 
in their market area. They have steady cash flows and they often generate stable dividend yields 
for the investors. The market is not pricing in a chance for massive future expansion anymore such 
as with the growth stocks. It is intuitive, that value companies seem like the safer bet, but on the 
other hand, based on the efficient-market hypothesis, the higher risk of the growth stocks should 
also be reflected in their market prices. 
4.1.1 Expected returns of value stocks 
To demonstrate the historical performance of value premium I used the Kenneth French’s data 
library from CRSP which is also referred to, for example, by Berkin and Swedroe (2016). French’s 
data consists of combined returns of all the stocks in the US stock market from the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX, nowadays known as NYSE American) and 
Nasdaq. Their portfolio data combines the needed accounting figures to the respective company’s 
return data and then sorts the return data based on the selected criterion, which in this case is the 
BtM-ratio.  
To account for the pervasiveness criterion mentioned earlier, I simply note that Clifford Asness, 
Tobias Moskowitz and Lasse Pedersen (2013) studied value premium in 18 different countries’ 
equity markets and found that the premium existed in all of them. Value cannot sensibly be 
measured in other asset classes as bonds or currencies, but I argue that the diverse geographical 
evidence is enough to prove value premium pervasive enough to count as a true factor.  
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Chart 1. The annual returns (%) of high-BtM stocks (HI, marked with green) compared to low-BtM 
stocks (LO, marked with red) 
I deducted the monthly returns of the worst 30 % of stocks based on the BtM-ratio from the best 
30 %. The data dates back to July 1927, but unlike French’s and Fama’s (1992) original studies, it 
also contains the latest data all the way to September of 2018. This means that there were 1107 
data points, which cover data from 92 years and 3 months. The combined excess-return when 
comparing high-BtM -stocks to low-BtM stocks was 375,21 % or 4,07 % when annualized, which 
represents the long/short-portfolio’s excess-return in this case. I also calculated the total return of 
the stock market by calculating the weighted average return of the top and bottom 30 % of stocks 
based on BtM and the “core” 40 %. When I compared the high-BtM returns to the returns of the 
entire stock market, the premium was still 233,40 % or 2,53 % annualized. This represents the 
long-only portfolio’s excess returns.  
To repeat and clarify, the excess-returns do not represent the annual total returns of the 
portfolios. The long/short-portfolio’s, the long-only portfolio’s and the total stock market’s 
average annual returns were 16,6 %, 15,1 % and 12,6 % respectively. For the long/short-portfolios, 
the total return is calculated by simply adding the excess-returns to the market portfolio’s returns. 
I do this simply to illustrate the size of the premium, as I will present practical solutions to 
investing with long/short-portfolios in more detail in section 5. 
Are the excess-returns statistically significant? 
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A question arises that what are the odds, that the excess-returns that I’ve presented are simply 
random? I will discuss shorter time-series later, but for the sake of proving that the historical 
higher returns are not simply an accident, I calculated the so-called t-statistics for the entire 
dataset. T-tests, that provide the t-statistics, are statistical tests which compare the average return 
to a null hypothesis and the standard deviation of the difference in returns. I used so-called paired 
two-sample t-tests, which are used when the same dataset is measured twice with some changes 
between the two measurements. The idea is to find out, what is the probability that the factor 
portfolio’s excess-returns compared to the null-hypothesis are not just a coincidence.  
In this case, the null-hypothesis, which the factor-portfolio is compared, is the entire stock market, 
which had standard deviation of 5,81. The BtM-sorted long/short-portfolio’s difference to the 
stock market had standard deviation of 4,02. The long/short-portfolio’s total standard deviation 
was 8,53. The same measurements for the long-only-portfolio were 2,16 and 7,18 respectively. 
The t-statistic is calculated as follows: 
𝑡 =
?̅? − 𝜇0
𝑠/√𝑛
 
Where ?̅? is the factor portfolio’s average monthly return, 𝜇0 is the stock market’s average monthly 
return (the null-hypothesis), s is the standard deviation of the excess-returns and n is the number 
of observations (1107 with all portfolios). The t-statistic is the compared to the t-distribution to 
find out the probability. As a side note, the t-distribution is used instead of normal distribution as 
we are calculating the odds based on a sample rather than the entire “population” (as it is not 
sensible to attempt to gather data for the complete set of all the data of the stocks’ historical 
returns). T-distributions vary slightly depending on the degrees of freedom, which are calculated 
as 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 = 𝑛 − 1. However, when the degrees of freedom exceed 30, the t-
distribution highly resembles the normal distribution. In most publications, as noted by Berkin and 
Swedroe (2016), the t-statistic that is found high enough for the excess-returns to be statistically 
significant is 2. Anything higher than 2 indicates even stronger significance. To prove this, I can 
easily compare the t-statistic of 2 with varying degrees of freedom to the t-distribution and see 
that the t-statistic of 2 implies roughly 95 % statistical certainty that the excess-returns are not 
random. The degrees of freedom in this case are always 1107-1 = 1106.  
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I calculated that the long/short-portfolio’s t-statistic is 2,81 (99,7 % probability) and the long-only-
portfolio’s t-statistic is 3,25 (99,9 % probability) meaning that both portfolios generate statistically 
significant excess-returns.  
Returns after publication of Fama and French 
Before addressing logical reasons behind the value factor, I will present similar statistics as above 
for time series beginning from the publication of the factor by Fama and French (1992) to this 
date. The reason for this is to prove that the value factor still exists even after wider audience has 
become aware of it and the market does not just simply price the value premium out. As 
mentioned earlier, the value factor was presented by other researchers already before Fama and 
French, but as their 1992 publication is such widely referenced (1717 citations in EBSCOhost 
Business Source Complete database) article, it is a natural choice for a benchmark. The article was 
released in June 1992, so the following calculations are based on data beginning from July 1992 to 
September 2018. 
The results were not quite as impressive as with the longer time-series though. The annual 
premium of long/short-portfolio was only 0,91% with t-statistic of only 0,44. The annual premium 
of long-only-portfolio was 0,64 % with t-statistic of only 0,60. Thus, neither of these premia are 
statistically significant. The dataset is relatively long, yet it does contain for example the two 
longest bull markets of US equities (October 1990 to March 2000 and March 2009 to August 2018) 
which might cause the results to be somewhat distorted. It appears, that the value factor has 
indeed underperformed compared to the total market, first total of -17,4 % from 10/1990 to 
3/2000, and then total of -5,1 % from 3/2009 to present date. Despite the long bull markets lasting 
roughly two thirds of the entire post-6/1992 dataset, the value premium was still positive after all, 
which could indicate that it has not disappeared even though there have been multiple academic 
publications related to it. However, whether the poor performance was related to value factor 
simply underperforming during bull markets in general, or due to the value premium getting 
priced out by the market, remains a subject for further research.  
Summary of statistics 
Table 1.1 and 1.2 based on data series from July 1927 to September 2018 
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Tables 1.3 and 1.4 based on data series from July 1992 to September 2018 
 
 
4.1.2 Logical reasons for value premium’s existence 
Risk-based 
I will first go through risk-based reason for higher returns of value stocks. In the chart 1, one can 
roughly observe that the High-BtM -stocks generate higher returns during economically good 
times but also higher losses during bad times. This is also represented by the higher standard 
deviations of the high-BtM -portfolios in tables 1.1 and 1.3. This already suggests that the returns 
of high-BtM stocks are more volatile and thus riskier than low-BtM stocks. And as noted earlier, 
higher risk should also be rewarded with higher return as well.  
Nai-Fu Chen and Feng Zhan (1998) discuss the reasons for higher risk of value companies. One of 
the key reasons for the higher risk is higher financial leverage used by value companies and the 
higher financial distress caused by it. Value companies have more stable cash flows and they can 
handle the periodical interest payments with more certainty than growth companies. Interest is 
Sorting Total Market Hi 30 % Lo 30 % Long/Short -premium + total
Average annual returns 12,6 % 15,1 % 11,0 % 16,6 %
Variance 33,7 51,5 28,3 72,7
Standard deviation 5,81 7,18 5,32 8,53
Based on Book-to-Market -ratio
Portfolios Long/Short Long-only
Annual excess-return 4,07 % 2,53 %
Standard deviation 4,02 2,16
t-statistic 2,81 3,25
Probability 99,7 % 99,9 %
Based on Book-to-Market -ratio
Sorting Total Market Hi 30 % Lo 30 % Long/Short -premium + total
Average annual returns 11,5 % 12,1 % 11,2 % 12,4 %
Variance 17,0 23,5 17,3 33,1
Standard deviation 4,12 4,85 4,16 5,75
Based on Book-to-Market -ratio
Portfolios Long/Short Long-only
Annual excess-return 0,91 % 0,64 %
Standard deviation 4,02 2,16
t-statistic 0,44 0,60
Based on Book-to-Market -ratio
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usually tax-deductible and due to the fact, that issuing new equity often reveals that the 
management considers the stock overpriced, as mentioned by Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf 
(1984), debt is generally preferred over external equity for financing when available. This means 
that in efficient markets all companies should prefer debt over external equity, but value 
companies are more likely to be able to withstand the financial distress that comes with it. Debt 
causes financial distress as interest must be paid out whereas dividends are optional. Thus, value 
companies generally have higher debt/equity -ratio (financial leverage) than growth companies, 
and thus they are also generally riskier. 
Robert Peterkort and James Nielsen (2005) go even further than Chen and Zhan (1998) and argue 
that the entire BtM-premium is explained by higher leverage. They found that in firms that have 
no long-standing debt there is no excess-returns associated with higher BtM-ratio. However, I 
argue that from investor’s point of view, this is not highly relevant as most value companies have 
at least some level of debt. They also note, that the leverage does not explain the entire BtM-
premium in companies that are at least partly financed with debt. 
Another risk-based explanation by Lu Zhang (2005) deals with my earlier observation of value 
stock returns decreasing more than growth stock returns during difficult economic times. 
According to Zhang (2005), value companies in general have higher amounts capacity based on 
long-term fixed assets. It is difficult to reduce this excess-capacity during economically bad times 
because the investments to fixed assets can rarely be reversed. Thus, value companies cannot 
adapt to the lower demand as well as growth companies and have higher risk. During 
economically good times, it’s relatively easy for both value and growth companies to raise capital 
and expand capacity, so in conclusion value companies end up being riskier. Again, higher risk 
should be rewarded with higher premium. 
Behavioral 
Next, I will go through behavioral reasons for value premium’s existence. The basic behavioral 
concept is mostly related to the overvaluation of growth stocks. Joseph Piotroski and Eric So 
(2012) researched these behavioral mispricings in their study. They found that the firms with low 
BtM-ratio and weak overall financial condition are generally overvalued where as the high-BtM 
and fundamentally strong firms were undervalued. In growth stocks, the investors tend to 
overestimate the future outlook even if the firm in reality has very weak financial state. In a similar 
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manner, value stocks might be undervalued, because investors overestimate the risk caused by 
higher financial leverage and tend to be too pessimistic about them. This leads to increase in the 
value premium.  
Another mispricing phenomenon is known as anchoring and is described by Berkin and Swedroe 
(2016). Anchoring in this case means investors’ tendency to hold on to losing investments as they 
do not want to sell them for loss. Instead, they rather hold the investment waiting for it to reach 
at least break-even level even if the investment does not seem profitable on its own anymore. 
Growth stocks might have very high valuation levels when measured with metrics such as price-to-
earnings (P/E) simply because their earnings levels are very small compared to the future 
expectations. The investors might anchor themselves to expecting the high return suggested by 
the P/E even though the future expectations might decrease after a while. So even if the P/E or 
other valuation metric keeps falling, the investors still hold on to their investments wanting to 
believe for the higher returns suggested by the previous high P/E would ultimately realize.   
 
4.2 Momentum 
Momentum refers to a strategy where the investor simply buys securities that have performed 
well in the past and optionally also short-sells securities that have performed poorly. Even though 
this strategy seems logical, it does not comply well with the basic logic of the efficient market 
theory. If the markets are efficient, the market price of the security should reflect all the relevant 
information about the security and any price changes should only be caused by new information 
becoming available. Thus, it does not really make sense that the past good (bad) performance 
would imply higher (lower) returns in the future.  
Yet it still is regarded as one of the most persistent factor strategies. One of the groundbreaking 
articles regarding momentum was published by Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman 
(1992) who noticed that momentum strategies generated high excess-returns. Importantly, they 
also argued that such high returns cannot be explained purely by systematic risk and that investors 
must have some sort of consistent behavioral bias that causes this effect.  
The momentum has then been discussed in multiple papers over the years. Mark Carhart (1997) 
combines the factor created by Jegadeesh and Titman to the original model by Fama and French 
from 1992 which I cited earlier in the value-section. Like the book-to-market -ratio, momentum is 
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calculated as “winners minus losers (WML)” by deducting the returns of top ranked securities from 
the returns of worst ranked securities. The sorting criterion in this case is simply the past 
performance of a chosen time period. Jegadeesh and Titman (1992) used past returns and holding 
periods of 6 months in most of their calculation, but they also studied different time periods and 
noticed that the momentum effect reached its maximum after 12 months. Most publications seem 
to agree, as for example Berking and Swedroe (2016) use 12-month periods for calculating the 
past performance. Nevertheless, I argue that the fact that different time periods have performed 
well for different researchers accounts for the robustness criterion for classifying momentum as 
true factor.  
I should note that there are two distinctive ways to measure momentum. The method explained 
above is known as cross-sectional momentum and the past performance of a single security is 
measured relative to the entire market. As a hypothetical example, this could lead to buying 
securities that have lost value over past months if the market has been losing even more on 
average. Another way to measure momentum is known as time-series momentum, which means 
that the absolute past performance of a security is used. This concept might be easier to grasp, as 
only securities that have gained value are bought and only securities that have lost value are sold 
short.  
There has been some discussion about which measurement should be used, and for example, Ron 
Bird, Xiaojun Gao and Danny Yeung (2017) compared the time-series momentum to the original 
cross-sectional momentum of Jegadeesh and Titman (1992). They argue, that even though both 
strategies generate excess-returns, the time-series momentum is the superior choice. This is 
interesting as the cross-sectional momentum has been clearly the most studied factor of the two. 
Despite the findings of Bird et al. (2017) I will use the cross-sectional momentum in my 
calculations as it has been the consensus choice in most literature and as I will show, there is high 
evidence of its strong performance.  
I used the same data source as with value, and the test portfolios were created exactly the same 
for easy comparison. Again, I will present long/short-portfolio which buys the top 30 % of stocks in 
the US stock market based on the past performance of 12 months and short-sells the worst 30 %, 
and long-only portfolio which only buys the top 30 %. The portfolios do not have specified holding 
periods like some of the portfolios in articles such as the one by Jegadeesh and Titman (1992), but 
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instead the portfolios are rebalanced on a monthly basis. This again makes the comparison 
between value and momentum easier.  
Momentum strategies can naturally be implemented in other asset classes as well, although that is 
out of scope of this thesis. For pervasiveness criterion of momentum, I refer to the same article as 
with value by Asness et al. (2013) which studied momentum in 18 different countries but also in 
other asset classes such as government bonds and commodities. The study found statistically 
significant excess-returns across all asset classes in all markets except Japan.  
4.2.1 Expected return of momentum stocks  
 
Chart 2. The annual returns (%) of winning momentum stocks (HI, blue) compared to losing 
momentum stocks (LO, orange) smoothed with 5-year moving average.  
The excess-returns generated by momentum were even more clear than with value. The 
long/short -portfolio generated total average annual return of 19,51 % and the average excess-
return to the total market was 8,25 %. The long-only portfolio’s return was also impressive, the 
total average annual return was 15,4 % and the average excess-return was 4,15 %. It should be 
noted, that the dataset that was used to calculate these returns differs slightly from the dataset 
used to calculate value premiums. The criteria for including a single stock’s data in the dataset are 
marginally different as the value dataset has criterion for both market equity data and book equity 
data, whereas the momentum dataset has also criterion for price data. Some missing data values 
might cause a small number of stocks to be excluded from either of the portfolios and the 
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momentum dataset also begins 6 months later than the value dataset (January 1927). Thus, the 
total average market return is lower at 11,25 % which amplifies the nominal values of momentum 
premiums. However, as the statistical significance of these results is very strong (as I will present 
next), I argue that this marginal difference does not affect the credibility of the results.  
The t-statistic for the long/short -portfolio’s excess-returns is 4,20 and for the long-only portfolio 
the t-statistic is 4,33. The probability for the excess-returns being only a result of randomness is 
less than 0,003 % for the long/short-portfolio and less than 0,001 % for the long-only portfolio.  
Momentum was discovered around the same time as value so for comparability, I will use the 
same starting date for the short-term calculations as with value, the July 1992. The long/short-
portfolio still performed well as the average annual return was 16,41 % and the excess-return 
compared to total market was 5,55 %. The long-only portfolio generated average annual return of 
13,48 % and excess-return of 2,62 %. However, as with value, neither of the excess-returns were 
statistically significant at 5 % significance (t-statistic of 2) as the t-statistics were 1,52 for 
long/short-portfolio and 1,54 for the long-only portfolio.  
 
Chart 3. Long-short portfolio’s 10-year moving average (green) and total market portfolio’s 10-year 
moving average (red) 
The above chart visualizes the long/short-portfolio’s performance relative to the total market. I 
smoothed both time-series by calculating the 10-year moving average to clear some of the high 
volatility seen in chart 2. Interestingly, we can see that the momentum performance has faded 
noticeably over the past years, but the poor performance begins relatively late after the 
momentum performance was discovered. In fact, the excess-return even increases towards the 
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end of the century and then diminishes just when the financial crisis started to affect the markets 
in 2007.  
However, before financial crisis, the momentum premium has been very stable over the years and 
changes in overall market performance have not affected the size of the premium. This suggests, 
that the poor performance of momentum over past 10 years would not be due to information 
effects or markets pricing the premium out. Jegadeesh and Titman in their subsequent article from 
2001 come to the same conclusion and argue that the stable premium over 1990’s despite 
multiple academic articles regarding the subject prove, that momentum premium is not simply a 
result of data mining.  
Summary of statistics 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 based on data series from January 1927 to September 2018 
 
 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 based on data series from July 1992 to September 2018 
 
  
4.2.2 Logical reasons for momentum premium’s existence 
Sorting Total Market Hi 30 % Lo 30 % Long/Short -premium + total
Average annual returns 11,3 % 15,4 % 7,15 % 19,5 %
Variance 36,2 30,8 64,0 34,2
Standard deviation 6,02 5,55 8,00 5,85
Based on momentum
Portfolios Long/Short Long-only
Annual excess-return 8,25 % 4,15 %
Standard deviation 5,43 2,65
t-statistic 4,20 4,33
Based on momentum
Sorting Total Market Hi 30 % Lo 30 % Long/Short -premium + total
Average annual returns 10,9 % 13,5 % 7,94 % 16,4 %
Variance 20,0 19,0 44,7 26,2
Standard deviation 4,48 4,36 6,69 5,12
Based on momentum
Portfolios Long/Short Long-only
Annual excess-return 5,55 % 2,62 %
Standard deviation 5,37 2,52
t-statistic 1,53 1,54
Based on momentum
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Risk-based 
When comparing statistics of value and momentum portfolios, one can clearly note an interesting 
difference. The high-BtM value portfolios have significantly higher volatility than the market 
portfolio which logically suggests higher returns. However, the top 30 % -momentum portfolio 
based on past performance has roughly the same volatility as the market portfolio. As a matter of 
fact, the low 30 % -momentum portfolio has the highest volatility of all momentum portfolios 
despite its relatively poor performance. I argue that this suggests that simply higher risk is not 
behind the high historical premiums of momentum stocks.  
One risk-based explanation to momentum is, however, the fact that momentum securities have 
generally high expectations loaded on them. The good past performance might be due to 
investors’ increased hopes for future profits and thus the tail-risk of these hopes not getting 
fulfilled increases. This increased risk could justify the higher returns. I argue that this might cause 
major losses of momentum strategies during financial downturns such as the one seen during 
2007-2008 in chart 3. 
Behavioral 
Most academic researchers agree with this as momentum is mostly considered to be a behavioral 
phenomenon, as noted by Berking and Swedroe (2016). Simple behavioral explanation is that 
momentum is caused by slow reaction of the markets. To recall, efficient markets -hypothesis 
states that any new relevant information about a security causes its price to react immediately. It 
is true that many professional investors might react almost immediately when new information 
arises but there are still many non-professional, or so-called uninformed investors, who do not 
follow the news as accurately. This causes the price to react slower than what one could expect 
based on efficient markets -hypothesis.  
This slow reaction causes temporary over- and undervaluation of securities. The reason why the 
financial markets do not reverse these anomalies is their relatively slow development. Zhi Da, 
Umit Gurun and Mitch Warachka (2013) compared how investors react to slow price 
developments relative to fast price movements. Their study suggests that momentum is simply 
caused by uninformed investors not reacting to small and gradual information signals even though 
larger moves cause appropriate price movements. This leads to short-term excess-returns 
captured by momentum portfolios.  
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Is momentum still viable strategy despite the recent underperformance? 
As I mentioned, it does not seem like markets have simply managed to price out the momentum 
premium due to increased knowledge about it. Multiple publications have been made already in 
the 1990’s about momentum stocks’ good performance yet the premium remained stable over 
the decade. I analyzed a recent explanation by Kent Daniel and Tobias Moskowitz (2016). They 
argue that momentum strategies tend to fail when the market volatility is high which leads to 
panic in the markets and major economic downturns, and the poor performance after such 
downturn is explained by relative betas of the long and short positions within the portfolio. For 
example, during a bull market when stock prices are rising, the stocks that are bought to the 
portfolio generally have high betas. This is because the entire stock market is rising, and the best 
performers just simply rise even more than the average. Correspondingly, the stocks that are sold 
short have relatively low betas.  
When the stock market then crashes, the high beta stocks tend to crash even harder than the 
market. When the portfolio is rebalanced after the downturn, the best performers during the 
downturn were the stocks with lowest betas because they suffered the least from the market 
crashing. This leads to low beta stocks getting bought to the portfolio even though they might not 
be the winners during the next bull market that follows the downturn. Thus, the momentum not 
only crashes harder than the stock market during downturns, but the poor performance also lasts 
long afterwards until the portfolio finally gets properly rebalanced. I studied this by calculating 
timeseries of portfolio betas for both top 30 % and worst 30 % portfolios based on momentum 
from beginning of year 2000 to September 2018. I calculated rolling covariances and market 
variances based on previous 100 days to illustrate the changes in the portfolio betas, based on 
daily data. This is somewhat shorter time period than Daniel’s and Moskowitz’s 126 days, but 
shorter time period illustrates the effect more clearly.  
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Chart 4. Rolling observations of betas of long (blue) and short (orange) portfolios (top and bottom 
30 % based on momentum) from January 2000 to September 2018.  
As we can see, the beta of the long portfolio has dropped significantly first during the Dotcom-
bubble in 2000-2002 and then during the financial crisis in 2007-2009. This suggests that the 
rebalancing of betas might at least partly explain the momentum’s recent poor performance and 
that the momentum premia might became more evident again in the future.  
5. Combining factors to increase risk-adjusted returns 
In this section, I will combine the two previously presented factors. My goal is to optimize 
portfolios which have the highest return relative to their risk. This is the key difference between 
the previous section 4 and the section 5 as previously I have only calculated the portfolios’ 
absolute performance. I will first combine only the factors, and second, I will combine the 
optimized factor portfolio with market portfolio to create an example of a factor portfolio which 
could easily be implemented also by individual investors. Last, I will examine possibilities of factor 
diversification during periods when factors are performing poorly relative to the market.  
5.1 Combining two factors  
The previous statistics have measured absolute excess-returns of value and momentum strategies. 
All factor strategies rely on good diversification as explained earlier. The factors, however, present 
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also a new type of diversification, which deals with combining different factor strategies to a single 
portfolio. Traditionally, diversification has been done across different securities and asset classes 
as well as geographically. Different markets react differently to varying economic conditions and 
thus the portfolio’s risk can be decreased by diversifying.  
Recall, that factors, both the ones backed by behavioral and risk-based explanations, are sources 
of increased systematic risk. Traditional diversification across securities, asset classes and 
geographical markets is also diversification across different sources of systematic risk.  
And as with traditional diversification, we can observe negative correlation between factor risks, 
which opens up opportunities for diversifying across the factor risks. For example, I previously 
argued that value premium has been performing poorly during bull markets and momentum has 
performed poorly during economic downturns. This implies, that there might be negative 
correlation between the two factors.  
Correlation between two datasets can be measured with Pearson’s correlation coefficient, which 
is calculated by dividing the covariance of the two datasets with the product of their respective 
standard deviations.  
𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛′𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑥, 𝑦)
𝜎(𝑥)  ∗  𝜎(𝑦)
 
The coefficient varies between -1 and 1. A positive value implies positive correlation and vice 
versa. In this case, negative correlation implies that the two portfolios react differently to the 
same economic events affecting the market. And indeed, the correlation coefficient between the 
excess-returns of momentum and value portfolios (deducted of risk-free return) is negative -0,43.  
I calculated 11 portfolios with varying weights between value and momentum to study the 
development of volatility and the average annual returns. To measure the risk-adjusted returns, I 
calculated the Sharpe Ratios for all portfolios. To calculate the optimal portfolio weights with the 
highest risk-adjusted return, I created a two-variable optimization model and ran it with Excel’s 
GRG Nonlinear solver engine. The goal was to maximize the Sharpe Ratio of the optimal portfolio.  
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Table 3.1 Statistics for Value, Momentum, 50 %/50 % equal-weighted and optimal portfolios.  
Out of the single-factor portfolios, momentum clearly produces the best risk-adjusted returns with 
Sharpe Ratio of 1,513. As noted earlier, it also produces highest absolute excess-return of these 
portfolios with annual average of 8,2 %. The equal-weighted and the optimal portfolio, however, 
produced clearly superior Sharpe Ratios. Despite the apparent superiority of momentum, the 
optimal portfolio’s weights were actually in favor of value with roughly 53,6 % value and 46,4 % 
momentum.  
To illustrate this, I plotted the 11 portfolios (100 % value and 0 % momentum, 90 % and 10 % and 
so on) along with the highlighted optimal portfolio. The so-called efficient frontier, where the 
returns cannot be increased without increasing portfolio volatility, is highlighted with red. The y-
axis shows the absolute average return and it is compared to the portfolio’s standard deviation on 
the x-axis. The lowest point on the y-axis is naturally the portfolio with 100 % value as value has 
the lowest absolute return. The momentum’s weight is then increased in 10 % intervals.  
 
Value Momentum 50/50 Optimal
Variance 16,177 29,514 6,710 6,312
Standard deviation 4,022 5,433 2,590 2,512
Average return (%) 4,094 8,219 6,156 6,007
Sharpe Ratio 1,018 1,513 2,377 2,391
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Chart 5. Plotted returns of combined value/momentum -portfolios with highlighted efficient 
frontier 
As the momentum weight is increased, the portfolio’s volatility decreases while the average return 
increases at the same time. The effect is very similar as when comparing to simple stocks except 
that now I am comparing two portfolios that are already well diversified across the equity market. 
This proves that both value and momentum portfolios’ risk-adjusted returns can be improved by 
diversifying across factors even if their absolute returns do not increase. 
5.2 Combining factor risk with market equity risk  
When I calculate the long/short-portfolio’s excess-returns, I effectively isolate the excess-risk 
generated by the factor from the equity market risk. The equity market risk is simply the 
systematic risk of investing in the total market and it is the source for the total market returns. The 
factors’ excess-returns is based on increased systematic risk generated by the factor. This means, 
that we can further diversify our portfolio across different types of risk. This is especially 
emphasized by Asness et al. (2016) who mention that long/short -portfolios generate risk 
premium that has low or negative correlation with market equity risk premium. When comparing 
the optimized factor portfolio to market portfolio, I once again noticed low correlation coefficient 
of -0,001 which implies possibility for diversification benefits.  
Brief example of isolating the market equity risk from factor risk 
 
33 
 
Chart 6. An example of isolating factor premium (red + striped blue) from market premium (blue + 
striped blue). The percentages represent the value portfolio of section 4.1 
To illustrate isolation of factor risk from market risk, I use a simple bar chart with percentages 
from the value portfolio of section 4.1. The market premium is marked with blue (including striped 
blue), and the factor risk exposure from taking the long position with value stocks is marked with 
red (2,5 %). If we would buy the value stocks and sell short the market, we would isolate the 
premium marked with red. If we sell short only the low Book-to-Market stocks, we isolate the 
market risk and gain increased exposure (4,1 %) to the factor risk which is marked with striped 
blue. The portfolio which combines only the red and striped blue sections of the chart does not 
contain any market risk and correlates negatively with market risk. After the isolation, we can then 
look out for negative correlation with other types of risk premia to gain increased risk-adjusted 
returns by optimizing.  
Optimizing the balance of factor risk and market risk 
In section 4.3 I diversified the portfolio across two different types of factor risk, value and 
momentum. Now I recombine that portfolio with total market portfolio to generate the highest 
possible risk-adjusted returns. I want to emphasize that this kind of diversification strategy could 
very easily be implemented by any individual investor by investing in factor-based Exchange 
Traded Funds with weights that I will present next.  
Again, I optimized the portfolio weights with Excel and present a 50 % / 50 % portfolio as an 
example. The following chart 5 plots Sharpe Ratios for all portfolios combining the factor and 
market portfolio with varying weights using 10 % intervals. This time the factor portfolio is the 
“Optimal” portfolio presented in section 4.3 with roughly 53,6 % value and 46,4 % momentum.  
 
Table 3.2 Statistics for Factor, Market, 50 % / 50 % and Risk optimized portfolios 
Factors Market 50/50 Market + Factor Optimum
Variance 6,311917 33,86712 9,972909 5,870644317
Standard Deviation 2,512353 5,819546 3,157991 2,422941253
Average Return 6,007304 12,51738 9,262342 7,830995662
Sharpe Ratio 2,391107 2,15092 2,932985 3,232020443
34 
 
 
Chart 7. Sharpe Ratios with varying portfolio weights for portfolios combining market and factors, 
optimum market with orange 
As we can see, the new optimal portfolio has lower average return than the market, but it 
generates highly superior risk-adjusted returns with Sharpe Ratio of 3,23 which is by far the 
highest of all portfolios presented so far in this thesis. The optimum weights were around 72,0 % 
factors and 28,0 % market, which leads to final weights of 38,6 % for value and 33,4 % for 
momentum. This is a simple passive investment strategy which has good diversification across 
stocks but also different sources of risk, a great example of strategies Asness et al. (2016) 
described in their papers. And most importantly, it could very easily be replicated by any investor 
even with low investment capital.  
5.3 Factor risk-optimization from 2010-2018 
As noted a number of times, both value and momentum have performed poorly since the financial 
crisis hit in 2007. It seems clear, that diversifying across both factors and market has been the 
superior strategy when comparing risk-adjusted returns in the long historical perspective. But 
would similar strategy have been a good choice also, when the absolute performance of the 
factors has been historically low? I studied this by optimizing all three variables (value, momentum 
and market) from January 2010 to September 2018 as this represents a time period of historically 
strong market performance and poor factor performance.  
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Table 3.3 Statistics for market portfolio and risk-optimized portfolios over 2010-2018 
Surprisingly, simply buying the market has not been the best the strategy despite the poor 
absolute performance of factors over this time period. Market has indeed been performing 
exceptionally well, with Sharpe Ratio of 3,76 (compared to 2,15 in 1927-2018) with absolute 
annual average return of roughly 13,7 %. I argue that this also partly explains the relatively poor 
performance of factors. The factor risks are not correlated with market equity risk and thus the 
strong period of market performance does not necessarily lead to high factor returns. In fact, 
market has been performing so strongly, that the average factor performance in the long run is 
worse than the recent performance of market, which leads to diminishing of factor premiums.  
However, the optimal portfolio still calls for only 68,4 % of market weight and 31,6 % of 
momentum weight despite the relatively poor performance of momentum seen in Chart 3, as this 
has generated an outstanding Sharpe Ratio of 4,25. I argue that this is explained by the negative 
correlation between momentum risk and market equity risk. The key finding here is the use of 
factor risks as hedging mechanisms against market portfolio’s volatility. Even when the factors are 
not outperforming the market and they are not generating absolute excess-returns, exposure to 
factor risks can help to diversify the portfolio risks and thus generate higher risk-to-return ratios as 
seen in Table 3.3. 
 
6. Conclusions and topics for further research 
I showed that both value and momentum factors have generated notable excess-returns in the 
past and there are several logical reasons for their persistence also in the future. I also provided an 
example of how diversifying across factors can improve the return to risk -ratio even with 
portfolios that have already been diversified across the market. The excess-returns have been 
statistically significant with very high significance levels from 1927 to this date.  
Market Optimal
Variance 13,27059 6,658824
Standard Deviation 3,642882 2,58047
Average Return 13,69458 10,96822
Sharpe Ratio 3,759272 4,250473
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The major concern regarding investing in factors is market pricing the premiums out as the 
strategies become more popular or as informed investors attempt to arbitrage them. However, 
there seems to be little evidence that the publications of literature revealing the factors would had 
affected the premiums. For example, the first major crash in momentum premia happened around 
15 years after the initial research publications.  
Despite this, both value and momentum strategies have been performing poorly over the past 
years. I found evidence, that value strategies’ poor performance is explained by general poor 
performance during strong bull markets. Similarly, I argue that post-financial crisis 
underperformance of momentum strategies is explained at least partly by time variability of betas 
in the momentum portfolio. 
Despite diminishing factor premiums, I showed that diversifying across factors can provide higher 
risk-adjusted returns even when the absolute factor performance is low. Thus, diversifying across 
factors can act as a hedging mechanism against market equity risk and I argue that this leads to 
practical implementations of factors even if their absolute performance is lower in the future. 
Using factors for hedging could be studied more deeply in future research. 
Whether the underperformance will persist in the future remains to be seen. In the future, this 
study could be expanded by adding more factors and especially by doing more analysis with the 
performance of multi-factor portfolios. The portfolios could also be more diversified across asset 
classes and geographical areas. Also, the list of behavioral explanations for these market 
anomalies will most likely never be fully completed as their effect is difficult to measure 
accurately.  
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